roles were "separated" and distinct; conversion was necessary (Strathern 1971, p. 225; and Burridge 1975) . Bounties were exchanged for ritual objects, and these were entered into the Bigman channels of reciprocity.
Creating a Network: Mobilizing by Indebting
Since feasting was labor intensive, support from both followers and wives would be needed. A pig pen had to be built, a club house, a platform for displaying gifts of food. "Puddings" had to be baked, musicians hired, opossums slain. These jobs were done with a quite hierarchical division of labor, provided they were directed by a Bigman (Burridge 1975; Oliver 1949a, b) .
Bigmen needed the help of an industrious family. Here, success bred success, since the sorts of exchanges that won the Bigmen prestige could also be used to accumulate wives. (Bigmen aspired to 8 or 10 marriages; some had 15 to 20.) Thus, to increase their access to household labor, they sought to entice outsiders to their followings. For example, Bigmen recruited Rubbish Men into their villages to swell the ranks of supporters, and then "thoroughly exploited" their underlings (Meggitt 1974, p. 75) . Recruitment, however, needed sweat capital: hard work put others in one's debt; work on one's behalf would once again be repaid, by a banquet.
In mobilizing local work, the Bigman had to avoid two contrary dangers. One was subsidizing "parasites" as supporters (Burridge 1970, p. 79) . The other was extracting too much and driving supporters off, to follow rivals. This danger constrained him to be a "moral" leader, who would not induce envy or shame and stand accused of sorcery. Rubbish Men especially were thought to be "jealous", and liable to poison a Bigman for a bribe (Burridge 1970; .
The defense against accusations, as against sorcery itself, was generosity. Similarly, the mere possession of pigs brought little prestige for the miserly. Goods had value only if deployed, in the framework of community norms (Burridge 1970, p. 31) . A Bigman adhered to these norms, inasmuch as generosity was part of his role. He tried to "secure dependents, who become indebted to him, by giving generously on every possible occasion" (de Lepervanche 1968, p. 177). In his initial exchanges outside his own domestic unit, as he built a track record of feasting and accumulating pigs, the terms of trade went against him. He paid more than "market" price.
The size and quality of a Bigman's exchange network were measures of his status (Burridge 1975 ). The network was also indirectly a resource. Alliances with other Bigmen would be needed to assemble the labor for a feast. Feasts required the marshalling of " more valuables at a single time than [one] would be able to accumulate in a decade" (Keesing 1976 , p. 374). Further, while there was a market in pigs, nurturing ties with suppliers required many efforts in networking (Oliver 1949a; Strathern 1971 ).
Energies were invested in aligning a wide-ranging set of exchange partners. As in all networking, indirect social relationships would be indirectly managed. A simple example illustrates the point that networks are not merely dyadic or direct. The Bigman might make this kind of proposal to a friend: 'Your young daughter will soon be of marriageable age. When her wedding is celebrated I will contribute a 60-span pig to the feast. But in the meantime, you can repay my "gift" by trading that 60-span sow of yours for that [larger] tusker of your father-in-law's and by giving me the tusker for my feast. After all, he's your father-in-law and will not be a hard bargainer with you, whereas he and I are mere acquaintances' (Oliver 1949b, p. 21 Some Melanesian societies had formalized networks of complex credit systems, known by such terms as moka and te. These "chains" of delayed exchange and financial arrangements were managed by the Bigmen (Strathem 1971, p. 4). Strathern saw in these chains "the tendency towards inflation and increase in the size of the networks, velocity of circulation, and volume of exchange" (1983, pp. 80-81). His explanation was suggestive of quick-flip promoters: the chains freed the Bigmen from the need to keep and care for pigs, but this freedom from operating duties did not leave the Bigmen free to make any deal they pleased. On the contrary, the chains helped to construct the normative systems within which Bigmen worked. As in all informal credit systems, they imposed a sturdy social control, if only through the multiple pressure points by which sanctions can be imposed in any complex network (cf. Cohen 1969; and Benedict 1968; Light 1972) .
Rivalry
Crucial decisions did underlie the "status-climbing feasts" (Strathem 1971). These multi-functional activities were (with regional variations) started and administered by Bigmen, who had to choose whom to indebt. They could gain a notch of Bigman reputation, by overwhelming a rival with more gifts than he could repay in one or two years. Oliver noted that "an ambitious mumi [Bigman] who is also shrewd will carefully estiniate his victim's ability to repay, and will go just beyond that limit... Sometimes two closely matched rivals will compete for years,... until one of them bankrupts himself and all of his relatives" (1949b, p. 14). The shrewd feast-giver could kill two birds with one stone, by inviting first a rival who would be humiliated by having to decline.
Triumph over an insolvent rival would be bittersweet. It would be better to make a show of the other's inferiority, but still be repaid. Guests wanted more gifts, in order to repay their own creditors. Thus, the risk in feasting lay not only in the chance of defaulting but also in the chance of being defaulted against. This risk, which was greatest with weakly connected debtors, derived from the norm that recipients not hoard their gifts, and from the perishability of gifts of food (Burridge 1975) .
Weaker players, whose claims could be postponed, had little choice but to continue making small advances in the hope of an eventual repayment. Stronger players, frustrated by the difficulties of achieving victory, were driven to overextension. The very cause of potential default, the recipients' reinvestment of gifts at the same time made it hard to defeat them; the complexity of credit chains made victory elusive. Bigmen therefore were tempted to overcommit themselves in the competition for supporters, but this was played upon by rivals who tried to take advantage of divisions. Divisions were further aggravated by succession problems, in which older men refused to step aside for younger aspirants.
The Spoils
Once an aspirant had become a Bigman, what was the prize in his triumph? It was, in part, and perhaps most importantly, "prestige", a "name", and "status". Meggitt argued that the Bigmen he studied "compete for prestige [not] just for its own sake" but for the sake of their highest moral value, the maintenance of territory, as prestige enabled a leader to attract "military allies and wives" (1974, pp. 63, 90-93).
The gain was, however, more than prestige; it incorporated a version of "profit". Bigmen had an acute accounting sensibility and knew their net obligations.2 They took " pains to avoid those situations where generosity may be asked of them and yet count for little" (Burridge 1970 own causes: "The host, and not his financial backers, receives acclaim... U'ta of Mi'kahna was a notorious promoter. Once he gave a feast and distributed an equivalent of 1,500 spans of money, 130 of which he himself contributed. He gained the prestige and his relatives paid the bill" (Oliver 1949b , pp. 14, 18). Finally, they " profited" once they were recognized as Bigmen, since the terms of trade then switched in their favor. No longer need they pay more than "market" rates; they now received more than they gave.3
The rewards included profit; they also included power. Bigmen took advantage of the weak, paying off those whose support had to be kept, but ignoring their debts to the feeble. The latter could be physically threatened by the "Bigman's proteges" (Meggitt 1974 
Bigmanship as Entrepreneurship

Library Tales
This account of Bigmanship has been styled as a "realist tale" (a matter-of-fact reconstruction that may or may not be evocative, but certainly sounds definitive) (Van Maanen 1988). Its research implications will be clearer, however, if we term it a "library tale", a term that will not be found in Van Maanen's (1988) typology of ethnographic forms. There can be no surprise that he overlooked the genre. Its fall from grace succeeded its long-lost, unjustified preeminence; no one now would seek to be cast as an "armchair anthropologist" (Barrett 1984 ; I. M. Lewis 1976). On one hand, this fall into stigma is not to be lamented; library tales are idle speculations, that deserve to be directed to their proper job of helping us to make sense of data. On the other hand, their value in this job is such that even the most muddy-booted, dogged of field researchers is also an armchair anthropologist.
This paradox derives from a process by which field researchers generate understanding. Glaser and Strauss (1967) discussed it as "constant comparison", but it remains largely undocumented: a hard-to-reconstruct dialectic between specific, ambiguous (emic and barely translatable) data, and any observations that promise points of contrast for hunches, propositions, and, it is hoped, grounded theory. Manifold Definitional dissensus also reflects entrepreneurial activities, the opportunistic and boundary-defying nature of which is reflected in anthropological definitions (Barth 1963; Belshaw 1965, p. 116; Glade 1967) . Emphasis on such attributes, familiar from Bigmanship, suggests that cross-cultural studies might be translatable into Melanesian terms, just as the reverse appears likely. Thus, we can launch a tour of cross-cultural notions, not with a definition in the usual sense, but with an expected confluence: Entrepreneurship is the recognition and pursuit of opportunities for the expansion of goods, without regard for the current control of resources.
Gaps, Conversions, and Bridges
What, then, can be said about entrepreneurial opportunity? In anthropology, an influential answer was given by Barth: it is a chance to bridge, and to create 4Bigmanship varied over time (Pflanz-Cook and Cook 1982) and space, and Lindstrom (1981) has cautioned against generalization. Nonetheless, area specialists have generalized to an ideal typical Bigmanship (Burridge 1970 (Burridge , 1975 Keesing 1976; Sahlins 1963 Sahlins , 1972 Strathern 1972 ). I use the term Bigman rather than Big Man for two reasons: possible androcentric bias in fieldwork (Tiffany 1987) , and the speculative, ideal-typical nature of the referent. conversions between, spheres of exchange. This fits the Melanesian example, in which a career could be capitalized by the returns from work in pottery, magic, trade, bounty hunting, etc. These returns, however, could not circulate directly in the institutionally separate "sphere" of Bigman exchanges. They had first to be traded for ritual objects, and thereby "converted" to values in the Bigman's sphere. Barth saw in such conversions a universal entrepreneurial tactic.
Barth identified two spheres of exchange (amongst an African people): a cash sphere, and another that centered on labor-for-beer (1967, pp. 149, 156). A "sphere" is a set of acceptable exchanges amongst categories of values. That is, it specifies not only what one can "buy" with particular goods, but also what one cannot. For example, labor for cash or beer for cash were unacceptable exchanges in the labor for beer sphere. For such proscriptions to stick there must be, between the spheres, recognizable barriers (Barth. 1963 (Barth. , 1967 . Respect for the barriers will, Barth argued, "allow considerable discrepancies of evaluation to persist as between items located in different spheres" (1967, p. 167). "Entrepreneurs will", therefore, "direct their activity pre-eminently towards those points in an economic system where the discrepancies of evaluation are the greatest, and will attempt to construct bridging transactions" (Barth 1967 (Long 1975 ). For many entrepreneurs their "most significant resource" is a ramifying personal network (Schneider and Schneider 1976, p. 11). Networks as assets offer the benefits of flexibility, low "overhead", and low initial costs (p. 104). These benefits suggest that networks can be assessed according to traits. A more general assessment can be based on Granovetter's (1973) distinction between "strong" and "weak" ties.
In order to gain access to strategic information, the entrepreneur needs an extensive set of weak ties; in order to mobilize, the entrepreneur needs strategic strong ties; that is, multidimensional ties with moral investments. Entrepreneurs can thus be expected to have particularly extensive weak ties, and strategic strong ties. (Schneider and Schneider 1976 showed this for entrepreneurs of their Sicilian study.) Extensive weak ties are needed for manipulating indirect ties, for solving the problems of long distance trust, and converting across spheres. Strong ties also are needed, for capitalization by sweat capital, and for further network investments to be made at lower costs (Long 1979) . Strong ties with well-connected people are needed to set in motion particular indirect effects (Cohen 1969; Long 1975 Long , 1979 Schneider and Schneider 1976) . Strong ties are needed for networking itself, because networking (as distinct from socializing) is the manipulation of the effect on oneself of indirect ties (Bott 1971; Gulliver 1971) .
For Bigmen, network decisions were strategic decisions, and much of their skill was rooted in network intelligence. They had to choose "to exchange under one rubric rather than another, to give to this group, but not to that, or to concentrate their gifts [investments] mainly in one direction" (Strathern 1971 
87). It refers to a perspective on any activity, which is moral to the extent that it is "right" within the framework of the culture involved (Douglas 1983; Geertz 1984).)
This duality-the moral and the tactical-is a leitmotif of anthropological writing on entrepreneurship. It is so because the activities studied are so often associated with moral frameworks, or idioms, such as ethnicity, kinship, and even class and gender. These frameworks are bases for opportunity recognition, and for mobilization. None can be fully reduced to either the moral or the tactical dimension. Ethnicity, for example, is an idiom about morality (including the morality of resource competition), reinforced by emotionally charged images (such as "homeland"). Ethnicity is also a political-economic arena, proffering access to material and social resources (Kilby 1971 Informal interest groups, and all social resources, are mobilized by networking. This requires tactical information. But network information is knowledge of society and culture; it is also moral knowledge. Therefore, although there will be cases where this will not hold (Hoselitz 1964; I. M. Lewis 1976, p. 232) we would expect to find many entrepreneurs to be experts in mainstream culture (Kilby 1971; on cross-cultural  variability, Etzioni 1987) .
Bigmen, certainly, were "cultural exemplars" (in Geertz's 1967, term for another example). We have seen that they were role models and political leaders. They were also culturally adept. They had to "be able to dance correctly, with verve, and have a wide knowledge of the various melodies, rhythms, and choreographies" (Burridge 1970, p. 75). Since they had to be able to sway public opinion, to persuade others to join in their ventures, they had also to be masterly orators and rhetoricians (Burridge 1970; Keesing 1978 Keesing , 1985 Entrepreneurs do seem sometimes to be at the margins. Those who can see more than one moral order, one sphere of exchange, are often the most widely travelled, and thus the most syncretic and cosmopolitan. This was true of many Bigmen, who, because they inspired envy, were exposed to the suspicions of sorcery that track the outsider. Their skills included the ability to take these moral risks, to breach certain norms, yet still be morally central (Belshaw 1955; Burridge 1970; 
How Are Resources Mobilized?
Entrepreneurship requires heavy investments in both the moral and tactical dimensions. The knowledge needed is a tactical resource, but also a moral commitment. Further, the tactically-oriented actor must first internalize and interpret norms in order to be able to change them. Not only this, but at a less conscious level, he or she must accept being manipulated by accepting the norms implied by membership in an arena (Cohen 1974 
Morals: Research Implications
Implications of this story could be pursued with many research methods. Two somewhat unusual approaches will be recommended. One is synchronic and comparative; the other, diachronic and intensive. In both strategies, limits to library tales are the impetus to return to the field (just as limits to single-site comparisons led to the search for library tales).
Differing cases can be compared due to acts of "translation" (Noblit and Hare 1988), but translations are prone to three sources of failure. First, subjects and predicates may be insufficiently commensurable, especially when they cut across cultural borders (Swartz 1982 Turner (1957) , require an understanding of a wide range of matters, such as Turner's trajectory away from structural-functionalism, and problematic treatment of the "matrilineal puzzle". (This puzzle hinges on apparent contradictions between residency patterns and rules for succeeding to rights.) Such a cost of erudition could be seen as excessive. Third, tales that are needed for constant comparisons might not be available, or might not report needed data. Gaps are inevitable if the theory to be developed is finely grained, as is common in ethnography.
Case Replication Research
These failings have stunted the cumulation of ethnographic theory, as has the common response of heading straight back to the field, either the same field as before, or another with few prospects for comparison (Barrett 1984 This convergence, which returns us to our opening theme of political-economic leadership, extends to the interpretation that entrepreneurship is a form of leadership found in many contexts, and that both entrepreneurship and leadership employ generic skills, such as those for coping with ambiguity and contradiction, and for using social networks to build coalitions and mobilize (Hosking 1988 Convergence extends beyond themes to research agendas. According to recent review articles on leadership (Hosking 1988; Yukl 1989) , researchers should try to do justice to political and interactive relationships, to "bottom-up" processes of organizing, and to the symbolic dimensions of these processes. They should try to overcome the fragmentation and noncumulative nature of previous work. These prescriptions can be applied without qualification to entrepreneurship, and likely to any issue of human agency and contextual constraint (Gunz 1989 ).
The problem of agency and constraint calls for the study of particular sets of actors, in specific situations, over (more or less) continuous time. It calls for continuous contextual analysis of the sort proposed by Van Velsen (1967), and represented by Gulliver (1971) and Turner (1957) , and, in organizational research, by Kapferer (1969 Kapferer ( , 1972 and Pettigrew (1973 Pettigrew ( , 1985 . In these works, the detailed grounding in process data focuses on, but does not absolve, the need to interpret the actors' intentions. It does clarify linkages between explanation and data, but not between data and macro assumptions. It also does not resolve the tradeoff between breadth of comparison and depth of understanding. For these reasons, it would be best used in conjunction with other methods, such as case replications.
Case replications and continuous contextual analysis are difficult strategies to implement. Any adequate approach to the issues they address will be demanding on researchers' time, energies, and funds (Davis-Blake and Pfeffer 1989; Gunz 1989; Low and MacMillan 1988; Shortell and Zajac 1988; Thomas 1988 ). Any such approach, let alone combination, might thus be most feasible in teams. However, team research is fraught with personal and practical complications. Moreover, organizational fieldwork makes demands not only on researchers but also on subjects. This makes access problematic, yet with case replications particular sites must be accessed, so that opportunism in selecting sites, which otherwise could be serendipitous, is inappropriate. Processual and replication studies can fill in gaps on our library shelves, but the obstacles entailed are so intractable that library tales will continue to be helpful, and privately often imagined, if seldom publicly told. four anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to Howard Aldrich, Anne Huff, Tom Mulligan -and Rein Peterson.
